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Key Acts and Cases for Alaska Tribal Court Jurisdiction
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Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (ANCSA) (1971).  ANCSA resolved 
the outstanding land claims of Alaska Na-
tives through Congressional action.  Prior 
to ANCSA, Alaska Natives held what is 
known as aboriginal title to land in Alaska. 
Through a series of United States Supreme 
Court cases dating back to 1823, aboriginal 
title was held to mean that Native American 
tribes were domestic dependent nations 
that had a right to occupy lands they had 
traditionally used but not to sell this land. 
This doctrine was later applied by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to Alaska Natives.  In the 
face of confusion over the exact nature of 
Alaska Native rights to land, ANCSA explic-
itly extinguished all claims to aboriginal title 
by Alaska Natives.  In exchange, a combina-
tion of Alaska Native village and regional 
corporations received $962.5 million and 
the right to select 45.7 million acres of land.
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 
(1978).  ICWA was passed by Congress to 
counteract a long history of Indian children 
being taken from their homes and being 
placed for foster care or adoption with 
non-Indian families.  ICWA contains sev-
eral provisions aimed at preserving Indian 
families.  It is important to note that ICWA 
only applies to foster care and termination 
of parental rights proceedings and not to 
custody disputes between parents.  ICWA 
sets heightened evidentiary standards for re-
moving Indian children from their families. 
If children are removed, there are “place-
ment preferences” that require, absent good 
cause to the contrary, that Indian children 
be placed with members of their extended 
family or with other Indian families.  Tribes 
have exclusive jurisdiction over foster 
placement and termination proceedings 
for children that reside on reservations, 
but even for Indian children who do not 
live on a reservation, foster placement and 
termination proceedings can be transferred 
to tribal court provided that the parents do 
not object to the transfer.  Federal and state 
courts are required to recognize tribal court 
decisions.  Moreover, if a foster placement 
or termination proceeding does take place 
in state court, the Indian child’s tribe must 
be allowed to intervene in the proceeding.
Native Village of Nenana v. State of 
Alaska, 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986).  A 
tribe sought in Alaska state court to trans-
fer to tribal court a petition to declare an 
Indian child to be in need of foster care 
services.  The State fought the transfer and 
prevailed, with the Court holding that the 
Native Village of Nenana was not a federally 
recognized tribe, that it had not attempted to 
reassume jurisdiction under the procedures 
set out in ICWA, and that federal law granted 
Alaska exclusive jurisdiction over custody 
matters involving Indian children.
Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council 
v. State of Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 
1991).  In this case, two village councils 
and two individuals who had adopted chil-
dren through tribal courts sued the State 
for refusing to recognize the legal validity 
of tribal court adoptions by denying the 
adoptive parents public assistance that they 
otherwise would have been able to receive. 
The State contended that tribal court juris-
diction had been removed by a federal law 
that pre-dated ICWA and which in general 
granted jurisdiction over civil matters in 
certain specifi ed states, including Alaska, 
to the state governments.  The court held 
that ICWA still allowed tribal courts to have 
concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over 
the types of cases covered by ICWA.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court held that 
tribes have inherent sovereignty—meaning 
that as distinct political communities, tribes 
can exercise authority over their members 
unless this authority has been removed by 
Congress.  Because Congress had not re-
moved this authority for Alaska tribes, and 
in fact had affi rmed it through ICWA, tribal 
courts could grant legally binding adoptions 
that the State of Alaska must recognize.
Federally Recognized Indian Tribe 
List Act (1994).  One of the issues left 
unresolved by the Venetie I.R.A. case was 
whether Venetie and Fort Yukon, the two 
Native villages involved in the case, had 
suffi cient historical connections to recognize 
them as being inherently sovereign.  The 
history of tribal recognition in Alaska is 
long and confusing, leading some to argue 
against the existence of Alaska Native tribes 
or that any tribes that may have existed were 
extinguished by ANCSA.  The federal legal 
status of Alaska tribes was clarifi ed in the 
early 1990s, fi rst with a list put out by the 
Department of the Interior in 1993 recogniz-
ing as tribes the Alaska villages specifi ed 
in ANCSA, and then the next year with 
the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List 
Act.  Initially 226 tribes were recognized, 
but subsequent amendments have raised 
this to 230 federally recognized tribes in 
Alaska.  Other than with one exception (the 
exception being the Metlakatla reservation 
on Annette Island in far Southeast Alaska), 
these tribes lack reservation land following 
the passage of ANCSA.
State of Alaska v. Native Village of 
Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 
(1998).  This case addressed whether the 
land selected by Alaska Native corporations 
through ANCSA constituted Indian country. 
This status is important because tribes can 
do things in Indian country normally as-
sociated with sovereign governments, such 
as tax business conducted on tribal lands 
and exercise criminal jurisdiction.  Venetie 
had tried to collect taxes from the State 
and a private contractor for constructing 
a school on ANCSA land to which it held 
title.  Relying upon a federal statute, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that there were three 
types of Indian country: (1) reservations; 
(2) dependent Indian communities; and (3) 
Native allotments.  The land in question 
was not a reservation because (other than 
Metlakatla) reservations had explicitly been 
extinguished by ANCSA.  The land clearly 
did not fi t the legal defi nition of Native al-
lotment land.  The Court then did a more 
detailed analysis of whether the Venetie 
land was a dependent Indian community 
and set out two criteria for this type of In-
dian country: the land must be federally set 
aside for use by Indians as Indian land, and 
the land must be under federal superinten-
dence.  The Venetie land met neither of these 
requirements because ANCSA lands were 
transferred to private ownership by state-
regulated corporations and could be sold by 
the corporation.  Thus, the land in question 
could not be considered Indian country. 
John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 
1999).  The seminal case in establishing 
tribal court jurisdiction over civil matters 
in Alaska, the Alaska Supreme Court in 
John v. Baker found that a tribe had inherent 
sovereignty to hear a custody case between 
tribal members in its courts. The Court made 
this decision despite the fact that the tribe in 
question (Northway Village) did not possess 
what could be classifi ed as Indian country. 
Rather, the Court determined that due to the 
central role that membership and regulating 
domestic relationships among members 
plays in exercising tribal sovereignty, juris-
diction rested not just with land but could 
also be derived from a tribe’s existence as a 
federally-recognized sovereign with powers 
over its tribal members. “Indian tribes are 
unique aggregations possessing attributes 
of sovereignty over both their members 
and their territory. Tribes not only enjoy 
the authority to exercise control within the 
boundaries of their lands, but they also pos-
sess the inherent power of regulating their 
internal and social relations.”
The Court noted that because of the lack 
of territorial-based jurisdiction, tribal courts 
in Alaska do not have exclusive jurisdiction 
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over custody cases and instead have concur-
rent jurisdiction, meaning that such cases 
could be started in either tribal or state court. 
But when a tribal court does issue a custody 
order, a state court should generally-speaking 
give recognition and legal effect to that deci-
sion, a principle known as comity. The state 
court is required to conduct a due process 
analysis to ensure that the due process rights 
of the litigants in the tribal courts were pro-
tected. As part of its due process analysis, the 
state court is to look at: (1) whether the parties 
received notice of the tribal court proceedings; 
(2) whether the parties were granted “a full and 
fair opportunity to be heard”; and (3) whether 
the tribal court judges were impartial and the 
proceedings conducted in a regular fashion. 
Tribal court procedures need not be identical 
to those of state courts, and state court judges 
should “respect the cultural differences that 
influence tribal jurisprudence, as well as 
recognize the practical limits experienced by 
smaller court systems.”
In the Matter of: C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 
(Alaska 2001).  This case explicitly overruled 
the decision in Nenana v. State of Alaska by 
holding that ICWA allows transfer of child 
custody cases from state to tribal court re-
gardless of whether the tribe had sought to 
reassume jurisdiction. Per the language of 
ICWA, state courts should retain jurisdiction 
if either parent objects to transfer from state 
to tribal court, the tribe declines the transfer, 
or the state court fi nds good cause to deny 
transfer. Good cause might exist where the 
state court proceedings are at an advanced 
stage, the child is over 12 and objects to the 
transfer, the child is over 5 and has had little 
contact with the tribe, or transfer would create 
an undue hardship to the parties or witnesses. 
Absent a fi nding of good cause or one of the 
other reasons for denying transfer, ICWA-
related custody cases must be transferred to 
tribal court.
Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, 344 
Fed. Appx 324 (9th Cir. 2009).  In response 
to the decision in In re C.R.H., the Alaska 
Attorney General in 2004 issued an opinion 
that state courts continued to exercise exclu-
sive jurisdiction over child custody matters 
unless the tribe had petitioned the federal 
government to reassume jurisdiction or the 
case had been transferred from State court to 
tribal court. In essence, the opinion directed 
State administrative agencies not to grant full 
faith and credit to tribal court decisions in 
cases that started in tribal court. The Kaltag 
Tribal Council and two adoptive parents sued 
the Alaska Department of Health and Social 
Services and its commissioner for refusing to 
recognize a tribal court adoption order. The 
federal district court affi rmed that tribal courts 
had concurrent jurisdiction under ICWA. The 
State had argued that tribal courts could only 
accept transfer of cases from state courts, but 
the federal court held that tribal courts could 
also initiate ICWA-related custody cases. The 
federal court further noted that jurisdiction 
was based upon tribal membership of the child 
and not that of the parents. This decision was 
affi rmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which reiterated, citing Native Village 
of Venetie I.R.A. Council, that “[r]eservation 
status is not a requirement of jurisdiction”.
State of Alaska v. Native Village of Ta-
nana, 249 P.3d 734 (Alaska 2011).  This case 
can be thought of as the state court equivalent 
of Kaltag Tribal Council. In Native Village of 
Tanana, the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
Alaska tribes have the jurisdiction to initiate 
child custody proceedings and that the result-
ing tribal court decisions are entitled to full 
faith and credit by state courts and agencies. 
Drawing on John v. Baker, the Court conclud-
ed that tribes still have concurrent jurisdiction 
over ICWA-defi ned child custody proceedings 
independent of the existence of Indian country. 
Tribal courts retain this inherent sovereignty 
unless specifi cally divested of it by Congress. 
Moreover, neither ANCSA nor the federal 
law relied upon in State v. Nenana divested 
tribes of their sovereign authority over internal 
domestic relations among its own members.
McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village, 265 P.3d 
337 (Alaska 2011).  McCrary sued Ivanof 
Bay and its president for a breach of contract. 
Ivanof Bay contended that because it was a 
federally recognized tribe, it possessed sov-
ereign immunity against being sued. Relying 
upon and affi rming John v. Baker, the Alaska 
Supreme Court agreed. Despite not having a 
land-base, Alaska tribes do possess sovereign 
immunity.
Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995 (Alaska 
2014). This case arose in Minto Tribal Court 
involving foster placement of a child (S.P.) 
who is a member of the tribe through her 
mother. Based on domestic violence allega-
tions against the father and substance abuse 
issues with the mother, the tribe took custody 
of S.P. in 2008 and placed her with a pair of 
foster parents, the Simmonds. The following 
year, the Minto Tribal Court sought termina-
tion of the parental rights of both parents. At 
a hearing on terminating his parental rights, 
Parks purports to have objected to the Minto 
Tribal Court having jurisdiction to terminate 
his parental rights because he himself is not a 
member of the Minto tribe. Parks also asked 
that his attorney be allowed to argue the juris-
diction issue to the tribal court, but the tribal 
court refused this by saying that attorneys 
were not permitted to provide oral argument in 
their courts. Parks claims that this violated his 
due process rights. Parks’ rights were subse-
quently terminated by the Minto Tribal Court, 
and he challenged this decision by fi ling a case 
in Alaska Superior Court seeking custody of 
S.P. The state court found both that the tribal 
court did not have jurisdiction over Parks and 
that Parks’ due process rights were violated 
by not being allowed to be represented by an 
attorney in tribal court. 
In a decision issued on July 18, 2014, the 
Alaska Supreme Court held that because Mr. 
Parks failed to appeal the tribal court decision 
within the Minto tribal court system, he could 
not bring his case in the State of Alaska court 
system. Tribal court decisions are due the 
same respect in this regard as would be deci-
sions from other states. The Supreme Court 
rejected Mr. Parks’ argument that an appeal 
would have been futile, since the Minto Tribal 
Court did have an appeals process, including 
the opportunity for his attorney to submit 
written briefs, of which he could have availed 
himself. Because the Supreme Court decided 
the case on this one narrow issue, it did not 
defi nitively decide the jurisdiction and due 
process arguments raised in the briefs, though 
the Court did reject the argument by the State 
that there was no tribal court jurisdiction 
whatsoever, holding instead that there was 
a legally credible argument to be made that 
jurisdiction over termination of parental rights 
attached to the child and not the child’s par-
ents. The full implications of this case are at 
this point unclear, but at the very least it means 
that litigants in tribal courts must exhaust the 
tribal appellate process before bringing the 
case in state court.
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